COMPARATIVE FAULT AND SETTLEMENT IN
JOINT TORTFEASOR CASES: A PLEA FOR
PRINCIPLE OVER POLICY

In American Motorcycle v. Superior Court, the California
Supreme Courtfailed to extend the 'pure" system of comparative
negligence to multiple tortfeasor cases. California's system of
comparative negligence remains pure" only from a plaintiffs
point of view. This Comment discusses how liability could, and
why liability should, remain in proportion to fault among all
partiesin any negligence case.
INTRODUCTION

In Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,1 the California Supreme Court replaced the antiquated rule of contributory negligence 2 with the
doctrine of comparative negligence. 3 This decision presented nu-

merous collateral issues, the most significant of which concerns
cases with multiple parties.4 Li, however, involved only a single
plaintiff and a single defendant, thus enabling the court to conclude that it was "neither necessary nor wise" 5 to address such
multiple party questions at that time. The issue became ripe in
6
American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court.
The first problem facing the court in American Motorcycle was
whether to extend the doctrine of comparative negligence to mull. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858((1975).
2. The contributory negligence doctrine totally barred an injured person from
recovering damages whenever his own negligence had contributed in any degree
to the injury.
3. Under the rule of comparative negligence an injured individual's recovery
is proportionately diminished, rather than completely eliminated, when he is partially responsible for the injury. Although Li abolished the legal doctrine of contributory negligence, the phrase or concept of "contributory negligence" is still
allowed as a designation of the plaintiffs own degree of fault. Wittenbach v. Ryan,
63 Cal. App. 3d 712, 718, 134 Cal. Rptr. 47, 50 (1976).
4. Liv. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804,823,532 P.2d 1226, 1239-40, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 871-72 (1975).
5. Id. at 826, 532 P.2d at 1241, 119 CaL Rptr. at 873.
6. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
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tiple-defendant cases while upholding the spirit of Li, which distributes losses in proportion to fault. The majority of the court in
American Motorcycle, rather than correcting the present extortive contribution system, 7 merely created a second one.8
Second, the court attempted to avoid undermining the strong
public policy in favor of encouraging settlement of litigation embodied in section 877 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 9 However,
American Motorcycle fails, in large part, to do this. Additionally,
the decision places counsel for insurance defense in an extremely
vulnerable position for liability based on bad faith settlement.
This Comment contends that in a ,"pure"'0 comparative negligence system, liability cannot always be in proportion to fault if
the policy of encouraging settlement is to be promoted for both
plaintiffs and defendants. This Comment suggests that the principle of liability in proportion to fault should control over the mere
policy of encouraging settlements whenever the two necessarily
conflict. Moreover, consistency and fairness in the administration
California legislation empowers a plaintiff, armed with a strong
7.
and lucrative claim, to settle with his antagonists one by one, preserving
for the jury the opponent with the most money and the least sympathy.
In a multi-party case, the threat of an unshared judgment against the last
remaining defendant--diminished only by meager settlements with his
eager fellows-permits a plaintiff to create acute financial pressures bordering on extortion.
River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 994, 103 Cal. Rptr.
498, 503 (1972).
8. The comparative indemnity doctrine created by American Motorcycle appears to have replaced contribution as it exists in California statutes because the
California Supreme Court extended the comparative fault concepts of Li and
American Motorcycle to actions containing either or both negligent and strictly liable defendants. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146
Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144
Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
9. CAL CIrV. PRoc. CODE § 877 (West Supp. 1978) provides:
Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not
to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith before verdict or
judgment to one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable
for the same tortIt shall not discharge any such other tortfeasor from liability un(a)
less its terms so provide, but it shall reduce the claims against the others
in the amount stipulated by the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or
in the amount of consideration paid for it whichever is greater, and
It shall discharge the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all lia(b)
bility for any contribution to any other tortfeasors.
10. A "pure" form of comparative negligence apportions liability in direct proportion to fault in all cases. The other basic form of comparative negligence apportions fault up to the point at which the plaintiffs negligence is equal to or
greater than that of the defendant. When this point is reached, the plaintiff is
barred from recovery. In Li, the California Supreme Court adopted the "pure"
form of comparative negligence. 13 Cal. 3d at 827-29, 532 P.2d at 1242-43, 119 Cal.
Rptr. at 874-75.
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of a system of liability in proportion to fault require the abolition
of the doctrine of joint and several liability.
AMERICAN MOTORCYCLE'S REPUDIATION OF T=E LI PRINCIPLES

American Motorcycle permits a joint tortfeasor who pays all or
part of a plaintff's recovery to assert a cross-complaint" in equitable indemnity 2 against other tortfeasors to obtain contribution
from them in proportion to their fault.' 3 However, American Motorcycle exempts from partial indemnity liability a tortfeasor who
has entered into a good faith settlement with the plaintiff.' 4 The
settling tortfeasor is, nevertheless, assigned a fault percentage

even though he is not a party. The plaintiff's damages are then
reduced by the dollar amount of the settlement,' 5 not by the per11. American Motorcycle specifically held that, with certain exceptions, the
California Civil Procedure Code generally authorizes a defendant to file a crosscomplaint against a concurrent tortfeasor for partial indemnity on a comparative
fault basis even when the concurrent tortfeasor has not been named a defendant
in the original complaint. 20 Cal. 3d at 607, 578 P.2d at 917, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
12. For a discussion of the indemnity doctrine, see Comment, Substantive and
ProceduralAspects of Indemnity Practice:A Practical View for California Lawyers, 26 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1974). The principle of partial indemnity between concurrent joint tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis is a modification of the
common-law doctrine of equitable irdemnity and is inapplicable to an indemnity
contract, which is governed by the intent of the parties and by contractual interpretation. Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 87 Cal. App. 3d 626, 676, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 399, 428 (1978).
13. 20 Cal. 3d at 591, 578 P.2d at 907, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
14. The court in American Motorcycle recognized that the common-law equitable indemnity doctrine suffered from the same "all-or-nothing" deficiency as the
discarded contributory negligence doctrine. Thus, the court concluded that the
doctrine should be modified to permit a concurrent tortfeasor to obtain partial indemnity from other concurrent tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis. Id. However, by allowing a settling tortfeasor to escape this liability and by requiring the
nonsettling tortfeasor to pay the plaintiff the share of damages originally allocated
to the settling defendant, the present rule merely shifts the inequities of the "allor-nothing" rule from the plaintiff to the defendant. See notes 19-26 and accompanying text infra. See also American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d
at 616, 578 P.2d at 924, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 207 (Clark, J., dissenting).
15. This reduction is required because the plaintiff is entitled to but one satisfaction for his injury. Carr v. Cove, 33 Cal. App. 3d 851, 854, 109 Cal. Rptr. 449, 451
(1973); Reinach v. City of San Francisco, 164 Cal. App. 2d 763, 768, 331 P.2d 1006,
1009 (1958).
The California Supreme Court in Li stated that the damages awarded a person
shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the
person recovering. 13 Cal. 3d at 829, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875. In addition to this "negligence percentage" reduction, a judgment may also be reduced by
the dollar amount of any settlement received by the plaintiff. The issue left undecided by American Motorcycle is whether the percentage reduction is to be made
before or after the dollar amount reduction. If the amount of the settlement is

centage of fault assigned to the settling tortfeasor.16 American
Motorcycle allows the plaintiff to recover the remainder of his
damages from the nonsettling defendant, regardless of his degree

of fault, on the theory of joint and several liability.17 Simultaneously, American Motorcycle gives this nonsettling defendant the
right to bring a bad faith settlement claim against the settling defendant in the initial action.' 8 The undesirable result of American
Motorcycle is liability disproportionate to fault, the discouragement of settlement, and the encouragement of bad faith claims.
Liability Is Ultimately Not in Proportion to Fault
Li eliminated the doctrine of contributory negligence as a total
bar to a plaintiff's cause of action because "it fails to distribute re-

sponsibility in proportion to fault."19 In many cases, the partial
indemnity doctrine created by American Motorcycle will also fail

to accomplish this goal.
A tortfeasor who is allowed to avoid implied indemnity liability
by settling with the plaintiff20 will frustrate the liability in proportion to fault spirit of Li if the settlement is lower than the
tortfeasor's responsibility for damages based on his degree of
fault. The following hypothetical situation illustrates the problem. Assume a plaintiff is ultimately found twenty percent at
fault, defendant D 1 seventy percent, and defendant D2 ten percent. Thus, the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment of eighty perdeducted first, the plaintiff will receive a higher total recovery because the negligence percentage will then be applied to a smaller sum. See Lemos v. Eichel, 83
Cal. App. 3d 110, 147 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1978). See also Peyrat, Comparative FaultPrinciplesand Problems Three Years After Li, in CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, Com'ARATrvE NEGLIGENCE PRACTICE 1, 58-62 (1978).
16. The relative merits of pro-rata or dollar-amount reduction were not briefed
or argued by the parties or by any of the numerous amici in American Motorcycle.
Moreover, the overwhelming weight of authority, contrary to American Motorcycle, supports pro-rata reduction rather than settlement amount reduction.
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 609 n.1, 578 P.2d at 919
n.1, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 202 n.1 (Clark, J., dissenting). See also UNIFomi COMPARATrVE
FAULT ACT, reprintedin Knoll, Comparative Fault: A New Generationin Products
Liability, 1977 INs. L.J. 492 n.1.
17. A concurrent tortfeasor whose negligence is a proximate cause of an indivisible injury remains liable for the total amount of damages, diminished only in
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 590, 578 P.2d at 907, 146
Cal. Rptr. at 189-90. However, American Motorcycle left undecided the question of
whether cross-defendants are jointly and severally liable to a plaintiff who did not
name them. The Court of Appeal, Second District, in a case decided after American Motorcycle, held that they are. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 492, 147 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1978).
18. 20 Cal. 3d at 605, 578 P.2d at 916, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
19. 13 Cal. 3d at 810, 532 P.2d at 1230, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
20. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
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cent of the loss against either defendant.21 From the outset, D1
knows from discovery he will be liable for a substantial portion of
the plaintiff's damages should the case proceed to trial. D1 also
realizes that the plaintiff is eager to settle quickly to avoid the
long delay incident to trial and is capable of pursuing the co-defendant. 22 Thus, D1 will be prompted to offer settlement in a sum
substantially below his share of fault. D2, wishing to limit his liability,23 will be required to compete with DL's offer by offering the
plaintiff an amount substantially in excess of his ten-percent
share of the loss.24
Hence, the policy of Li is frustrated in three ways. First, that
D2 is compelled to offer a sum above his degree of fault is contrary to the liability in proportion to fault principle. Second, if
D2 's attempt to settle fails and Dl's offer is successful, 25 D 2 will
ultimately be liable for a large percentage of the loss instead of an
amount in accordance with his ten percent of fault.26 Third, 1)2 is
compelled to pay plaintiff damages when the plaintiff himself was
more responsible than D2 for his injuries.
21. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
22. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 610, 578 P.2d at
920, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 203 (Clark, J., dissenting). See note 17 and accompanying text
supra. See also Comment, Comparative Negligence, Multiple Partiesand Settlements, 65 CAmIF. L. REV. 1264, 1280 (1977).
23. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 610, 578 P.2d at
920, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 203 (Clark J., dissenting). Either defendant could be held severally liable for as much as 80% of the judgment if the other defendant was insolvent, unaible to pay for some other reason, or immune from payment. With respect
to immunity, see Baxter v. Scottish Rite Temple Ass'n, 86 Cal. App. 3d 492, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 511 (1978); Arbaugh v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 80 Cal. App. 3d 500, 145
Cal. Rptr. 608 (1978).
24. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 610, 578 P.2d at
920, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 203 (Clark, J., dissenting). Although the plaintiff could settle
with both parties, in practice the plaintiff accepts the best settlement offer and
brings an action against the remaining tortfeasors. See also note 7 supra. For a
discussion of avoiding responsibility for the fault of others as a motivation for settlement, see Davis, Comparative Negligence, Comparative Contribution, and
Equal Protectionin the Trial and Settlement ofMultiple Defendant Product Cases,
10 IND. L. REv. 831, 858 (1977).
25. For a discussion of the danger of collusion in settlements, see Comment,
Settlement in Joint Tort Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 486, 490 (1966).
26. For a discussion of the practical difficulty of enforcing the good faith requirement in settlements, see Comment, ComparativeNegligence, Multiple Parties
and Settlements, 65 CAUiF. L. REV. 1264, 1268 (1977). See also American Motorcycle
Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 614, 578 P.2d at 922, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 205
(Clark, J., dissenting).

DefendantsAre Not Encouragedto Settle
The law strongly discourages litigation and strongly favors compromise of doubtful rights and controversies, either in or out of
court.2 7 Settlement agreements are highly favored as productive
of peace and goodwill in the community and as reducing the expense and persistency of litigation. 28 The application of American
Motorcycle in many instances does not promote this policy. First,
the availability of comparative contribution eliminates codefendants' concern with proving the plaintiff's assumption of risk
or contributory negligence in order to have their liability extinguished. 2 9 This fact alone will cause many defendants to avoid
settlement. Second, a nonsettling tortfeasor has a civil claim for
damages under California Civil Procedure Code section 887
against either the victim of the tort who exercised bad faith in
making a settlement or the settling defendant.30 The nonsettling
tortfeasor may set off this claim against the victim's tort action recovery and may receive pro rata, rather than pro tanto, credit
against any judgment rendered in that action against the nonsettling tortfeasor. 3 1 Moreover, American Motorcycle allows the nonsettling defendant to file this claim of bad faith in the initial
action instead of waiting until his claim of indemnity against the
settling defendant has been upheld.3 2 Hence, the claim of bad
faith will discourage D 1 from settling because his settlement will
not ordinarily prevent his participation in the litigation of the is33
sues of damages and relative fault.
27. Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 236, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843,
846 (1976).
28. Id.
29. Under American Motorcycle, a defendant will, of course, attempt to establish the plaintiff's degree of fault to reduce the plaintiff's recovery. However, this
burden is much less formidable than that of proving the plaintiff's assumption of
risk or contributory negligence.

30. See text accompanying notes 38-41 infra. For the text of § 877, see note 9
supra.
31. Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974);
River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498

(1972).
32. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d. at 605, 578 P.2d at
916, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
33. Id. at 610 n.2, 578 P.2d at 920 n.2, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 203 n.2 (Clark, J,,.dissenting). Nonsettling defendants will routinely file bad faith claims against settling

defendants because no deterrent exists to prevent them from doing so. See notes
62-80 and accompanying text in.fra. "Few things would he better calculated to
frustrate [§ 877's] policy, and to discourage settlement of disputed tort claims,
than knowledge that such a settlement lacked finality and would ... lead to further litigation with one's joint tortfeasors, and perhaps further liability." Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 236, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843, 846 (1976).
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Bad Faith Claims by Nonsettling Defendants Are
Encouraged
If one pursues the foregoing illustration and principles, 3 4 the
following sequence of events demonstrates how bad faith claims
are encouraged. Plaintiff will settle with D, in an amount below
D 1 's seventy-percent degree of fault.35 D2 will then be liable for
the amount of plaintiffs damages less the amount of plaintiffs
own degree of fault and less the dollar amount of the settlement. 36 D2's liability will be in an amount greater than his tenpercent degree of fault. Thus, 12 will exercise his immediate
right to file a bad faith claim against D, because no other way ex-

ists to obtain contribution from D_.37
Moreover, if D 2 establishes that the settlement between plaintiff and D, was made in bad faith, River GardenFarms,Inc. v. Superior Court38 suggests the detriment to D_ (possibly the amount
by which the judgment against him exceeds his assigned degree
of fault) may be set off against the judgment.3 9 The plaintiff,
under this procedure, assumes the full burden of a disproportionately low settlement. Lareau v. Southern Pacific Transportation
34. See notes 11-26 and accompanying text supra.
35. See Davis, ComparativeNegligence, Comparative Contribution, and Equal
Protection in The Trial and Settlement of Multiple Defendant Product Cases, 10
IND. L. REV. 831, 849 (1977); Comment, Comparative Negligence, Multiple Parties
and Settlements, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 1264, 1268 (1977). However, a few courts have
disagreed that settlement takes place in this proportion and have speculated that
defendants generally contribute to the settlement in rough proportion to what
they think their negligence is. Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 12, 114 N.W.2d 105,
111 (1962). See also Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465 (D.V.L 1967).
36. See notes 15-16 and accompanying text supra.
37. Peyrat, Comparative Fault: Principlesand Problems Three Years After Li,
in CALIFORNIA CONTIINUG EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CoMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
PRACTICE 1, 41 (1978). See note 14 and accompanying text supra. D2 's argument
for bad faith settlement will be based on the discrepancy between the amount D1
settled for and the amount D1 should be liable for based on his degree of fault.
"In the decisions involving wrongful refusal to settle, price is the immediate signal
for the inquiry into good faith, but only one of the many factors influencing the
finding." River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 997, 103
Cal. Rptr. 498, 506 (1972).
38. 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972).
39. Peyrat, ComparativeFault Principlesand Problems Three Years After Li,

in

CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE

BAR,

COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

PRACTICE 1, 41 (1978). "The non-settling tortfeasor has a civil claim for damages
against the claimant who exercised bad faith. He may set off this claim against
the latter's tort recovery and receive credit against any judgment recovered in the
tort suit." River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 1001,
103 Cal. Rptr. 498, 509 (1972) (emphasis added).

Co.40 suggests, however, a recovery from both the plaintiff and
the settling defendant. 4 1 Regardless of which method is used, a
plaintiff's or a defendant's desire to settle a case would be inhibited.
Rights of the Settling Defendant
The foregoing situations assume that the settling defendant will
settle in an amount less than his degree of fault. American Motorcycle, however, leaves undecided the issue of whether a settling
co-defendant has a right to pursue his cross-complaint for partial
indemnity after settling with the plaintiff for an amount greater
than the amount of loss for which he is ultimately found responsible.42 Obviously, if defendants could not recover this difference,
they would be reticent to settle cases in which their proportion of
liability was difficult to estimate. 43 This uncertainty will be a
common occurrence given the inconsistency among juries and the
complexities of multi-party litigation."
A settling concurrent tortfeasor should be allowed to pursue his
right of equitable partial indemnity against other concurrent
tortfeasors. This rule would not detract from the plaintiff's recovery because the plaintiff is still entitled to receive compensation
from the nonsettling defendants in amounts according to their degrees of fault.45 Furthermore, this rule encourages defendants to
settle and effectuates the policy of equitable apportionment of the
loss among joint tortfeasors.46
40. 44 Cal. App. 3d 783, 118 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1975).
41. 'Thus, the judgment against Southern Pacific (non-settling joint tortfeasor) and in favor of Mrs. Lareau (plaintiff) has given Southern Pacific an accrued cause of action against the plaintiff and the settling defendants for an
alleged past wrong .... " Id. at 798, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 846 (emphasis added).
42. Subsequent to American Motorcycle the California Court of Appeal, Second District, held that in a case with a single plaintiff and a single defendant, a
settling concurrent tortfeasor may continue to pursue his right of partial indemnity asserted by a pre-settlement cross-complaint against a party not named by
the plaintiff. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d
492, 147 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1978).
43. However, a rule to the contrary arguably would discourage the plaintiff
from settling the case. Theobald v. Angelos, 44 N.J. 228, 208 A.2d 129 (1965). See
also Comment, Comparative Negligence, Multiple Parties and Settlements, 65
CALIF. L. REV. 1264, 1279 (1977). However, this should not be a significant concern.
See notes 103-07 and accompanying text infra.
44. Prosser states that because each case involving comparative fault must
turn upon all the circumstances, "there can be no definite rules, and cases which
on their face appear to involve more or less identical conduct on each side quite
frequently have come out with quite different results." W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 67, at 438 (4th ed. 1971).
45. Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. International Harvester Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 492,
496, 147 Cal. Rptr. 262, 264 (1978).
46. Id.

[VOL. 16: 833, 1979]

Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

THE DILEMMA OF COUNSEL FOR INSURANCE DEFENSE

American Motorcycle has created a particularly delicate situation for defense counsel of an insurance company.47 The implied
covenant of good faith48 and fair dealing imposes a duty on an insurer to settle a claim against its insured within policy limits
whenever a substantial likelihood exists that a claim in excess of
those limits may be upheld.49 Indicia of bad faith do not include a
showing of dishonesty, fraud, or concealment; 50 rather, the test is
whether a prudent insurer without policy limits would have ac-

cepted the offer.5 1 The insurer is liable when the most reasonable
manner of disposing of the claim would have been to accept the

settlement.52 In other words, liability is imposed on the insurer
47. For a general discussion of an insurer's liability for refusal to settle, see
Note, Insurer'sLiabilityfor Refusal to Settle: Beyond Strict Liability, 50 S. CAL. L.
REV. 751 (1977).
48. In every insurance contract there is an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, and the duty to so act is immanent in the contract whether the insurer is attending to the claims of third persons or to the claims of the insured
himself. Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9,
538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510
P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal.
App. 3d 917, 122 Cal Rptr. 470 (1975). The California Supreme Court has recently
held that a third party claimant may sue an insurer for bad faith settlement without an assignment from the insured. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, Cal. 3d -, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979). Contra,Murphy v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976).
In deciding whether the insurer's refusal to settle constitutes a breach
of its duty to exercise good faith, the following factors should be considered: the strength of the injured claimant's case on the issues of liability
and damages; attempts by the insurer to induce the insured to contribute
to a settlement; failure of the insurer to properly investigate the circumstances so as to ascertain the evidence against the insured; the insurer's
rejection of advice of its own attorney or agent; failure of the insurer to
inform the insured of a compromise offer; the amount of financial risk to
which each party is exposed in the event of a refusal to settle; the fault of
the insured in inducing the insurer's rejection of the compromise offer by
misleading it as to the facts; and any other factors tending to establish or
negate bad faith on the part of the insurer.
Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 689, 319 P.2d 69, 75 (1958). See
also Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1973); CAL.
INS. CODE § 790.03 (West Supp. 1978).
49. Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424
(1976); Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538
P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d
173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
50. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967).
51. Id. at 429, 426 P.2d at 176-77, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
52. Id. at 430, 426 P.2d at 176-77, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16-17.

ipso facto for failure to meet the duty to accept reasonable settle53
ment.
54
If an insurer breaches this duty to settle within policy limits,
the insured may recover the excess award over policy limits, as
well as consequential5 5 and punitive 56 damages. Moreover, if a
primary liability insurer breaches its duty to settle within policy
limits and such breach of duty causes economic loss to an excess
liability insurer, the primary liability insurer is liable to the ex-

cess liability insurer for the amount the excess carrier is obliged
to pay in discharge of its insured's liability.57
The following example illustrates the new problem caused by
American Motorcycle. A jury has found that plaintiff is entitled to
an $80,000 judgment against D1 and 1)2. Plaintiff was found
twenty percent at fault for a $100,000 total loss, and his judgment

was reduced accordingly. 58 D1 and

D2

are found twenty percent

and sixty percent at fault respectively. D2 has a primary insurance carrier for claims within $30,000 and has an excess carrier for
amounts beyond this limit. If plaintiff offers D2 a settlement
within the $30,000 limit59 and D2's primary insurance carrier refuses it, D 2 's primary insurance carrier could be held liable to the
excess carrier for a judgment awarded plaintiff against D2 in excess of the $30,000 policy limits. Obviously, this result is plausible
60
on these facts because D2 is responsible for $60,000 damages.

Alternatively, if D2's primary insurance carrier accepts the settle53. Id. at 430, 426 P.2d at 176-77, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
54. The insurer will be liable for failure to settle even if the refusal is based on
a bona fide belief that the policy does not provide coverage. Gibb v. State Farm
Mut. Ins. Co., 544 F.2d 423 (1976); Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n InterIns. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975); Communale v.
Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
55. The insured may recover damages in this instance for economic loss, physical impairment, and emotional distress. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d
566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d
425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48
Cal. App. 3d 917, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1975).
56. Cain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 783, 121 Cal. Rptr.
200 (1975).
57. Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1977); Peter v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 1347 (CD. Cal. 1974); Transit Cas. Corp. v. Spink Corp., 78
Cal. App. 3d 509, 144 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1978) (excess carrier may recover if either the
insured or the primary liability insurer breaches the duty to act in good faith when
rejecting settlement); Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group, 76 Cal.
App. 3d 1031, 143 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1978). For criticism of this result, see Comment,
Applying the Bad Faith Doctrine to the Primaryand Excess Insurance CarrierRelationshipin California,7 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 277 (1974).
58. See note 15 supra.
59. This offer to settle an excess claim within policy limits is a necessary element in a wrongful refusal to settle cause of action. Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34
Cal. App. 3d 858, 877, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511, 523-24 (1973).
60. An insurer, in a practical sense, is strictly liable for refusal to settle on
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ment offer, it could be found liable to D 1 for a bad faith settlement
because of the discrepancy between the settlement (less than
$30,000) and the amount for which he should be liable based on
his relative fault ($60,000).61 Hence, the primary insurance carrier
for D2 will be faced with a bad faith claim regardless of whether
it accepts or rejects the settlement offer.
THE MALICIOUS PROSECUTION COUNTERCLAIM

Assuming the doctrine of joint and several liability is not abolished,6 2 bad faith claims by nonsettling tortfeasors will proliferate

because no deterrent exists to prevent those tortfeasors from
fling them. These claims not only will undermine the policies of
Li63 but

will also add confusion to an already complex case. The

question then becomes one of how to limit bad faith claims.
Ironically, American Motorcycle suggests a possible solution.
Arguably, a settling defendant now faced with a bad faith claim
may bring a counterclaim of its own for malicious prosecution in
the initial action. This threat may act as a deterrent to the practice of routinely filing a bad faith claim whenever a codefendant
settles with the plaintiff.64 In the first example mentioned above,
D_ (ten percent at fault), who is ultimately held liable for a large
percentage of the loss because D1 (seventy percent at fault) settled with the plaintiff,65 will likely file a bad faith claim against the
settling defendant. The settling defendant in turn probably will
seek to file a claim for malicious prosecution against D 2 .
Under traditional malicious prosecution principles, D1 is barred
from this action until he can base his claim on a final judgment
these facts according to the trend in California case law. The trend began in Critz
v. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App. 2d 788, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1964):
Where the potential value of the claim is large in relation to the policy
limit, where the claimant's case is comparatively strong and the potential
defendant's weak, rejection of an initial offer to settle at or near the policy
limit may then and there constitute a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith.
Id. at 798, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 406. See also Comment, In CaliforniaExcess Liability
Cases, Does Bad Faith in Law EqualStrict Liability in Practice?,4 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 115 (1976).
61. See notes 29-37 and accompanying text supra.
62. See notes 103-07 and accompanying text infra.
63. See notes 20-41 and accompanying text supra.
64. See notes 29-37 and accompanying text supra.
65. Id.

rendered in his favor.66 DI could argue, however, that because
American Motorcycle extended the contravention of a traditional
rule67 and allows D 2 to file a cross-complaint for implied indem-

nity prior to the time its claim for indemnity has been upheld, 68
D, should be allowed to file a malicious prosecution claim prior to
the time its good faith settlement has been upheld.
The primary obstacle to DI's malicious prosecution counterclaim argument is Babb v. Superior Court.69 The California

Supreme Court in Babb found three principal reasons for denying
the malicious prosecution counterclaim in the original suit. First,
a possibility existed that the malicious prosecution counterclaim
70
would be used merely to harass the other parties in the action.

This reason is not very persuasive in a joint tortfeasor case 71 in
light of American Motorcycle because the same rationale could be
used to forbid defendants such as D2 from filing bad faith claims
against codefendants. Certainly, the law under American Motorcycle encourages them to do just that. 72
The second argument made by the Babb court was that the attorney filing the bad faith claim could become a potential adversary of his client if his client was sued for malicious
prosecution.7 3 In other words, if D 2 's attorney filed a bad faith
claim against D 1 in the initial action, D,)'s attorney would be sued
by his own client if D1 were allowed to file its malicious prosecution counterclaim in the initial action against D 2 . The attorney
would have a potential conflict of interest with his client and
could not bring the bad faith claim and stay in the action.74
Again, however, this same rationale could be used to deny a non66. Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 479 P.2d 379, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1971).
See also 4 B. WITcw, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw 2533-34 (8th ed. 1974).
67. The rule once was that an action for indemnity could not be maintained
until the person seeking indemnity had paid the claim in question and that any
attempt to involve the alleged indemnitor in the original action was premature.
Dreybus v. Bayless Rents, 213 Cal. App. 2d 506, 507-08, 28 Cal. Rptr. 825, 826 (1963).
See also Comment, Substantive and ProceduralAspects of Indemnity Practice: A
Practical Viewfor CaliforniaLawyers, 26 STAN. L REV. 577, 583 (1974).
68. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 605, 578 P.2d at
916, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
69. 3 Cal. 3d 841, 479 P.2d 379, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1971).
70. Id. at 849, 479 P.2d at 383, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
71. Babb involved a single plaintiff and a single defendant. Id. at 841, 479 P.2d
at 379, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
72. See notes 20-41 and accompanying text supra.
73. Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d at 849, 479 P.2d at 383, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
74. The ABA CODE OF PROFEssIONAL REsPoNsmuLry § 5-102(B) provides:
If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation,
a lawyer learns, or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm may be
called as a witness other than on behalf of his client, he may continue the
representation until it is apparent that his testimony is or may be prejudicial to his client.
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settling defendant the right to file a bad faith claim because attorneys for settling defendants could also become adversaries of
their clients when the clients were sued for bad faith settlements.
Moreover, a conflict of interest would exist between the attorney
and his client whether the cross-complaint for malicious prosecution was asserted during or after the initial trial.
The third argument given by the California Supreme Court in
Babb was that because an indemnity claim usually arises out of
the same transaction as the principal action at issue, the same
evidence is relevant to both.75 However, in a cross-action for malicious prosecution, the evidence would be aimed at the motives
and state of mind of the original plaintiff rather than at the substantive issues of that original action.7 6 This argument is not persuasive in cases where the bad faith claim and the malicious
prosecution counterclaim are between nonsettling and settling
defendants. 77 The substantive issue involved in both cross-complaints is basically the nature of the settlement between the
plaintiff and the settling defendant. Thus, the "same evidence" 78
would be relevant to both, and no significant complexity would be
added to the case. Moreover, not to allow malicious prosecution
counterclaims in the initial action may cause unreasonable delay
in the ultimate resolution of cases similar to that found in "bad
faith" insurance cases. 7 9 Case law indicates, however, that the

malicious prosecution counterclaim argument will probably continue to fail and that the routine filing of bad faith claims will continue to discourage settlement.8 0
ABOLIrTION OF JOM AND SEVERAL LIABILITY

As the preceding three sections illustrate, holding nonsettling
75. 3 Cal. 3d at 849, 479 P.2d at 383, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
76. Id. at 849, 479 P.2d at 384, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
77. Babb did not involve settlement between a plaintiff and a joint tortfeasor.
The defendant in Babb sought to counterclaim against the plaintiff in the original
action. Id.
78. Id. at 849, 479 P.2d at 383, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
79. Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538
P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975), was filed on December 27, 1963, and arose out of
an accident on February 26, 1963.
80. In fact, two California court of appeal cases decided after American Motorcycle have impliedly reaffirmed the requirement of pleading a favorable determination of the underlying action in a malicious prosecution complaint. Hackner v.
LaCroix, 88 Cal. App. 3d 948, 951, 152 Cal. Rptr. 221, 223 (1979); 117 Sales Corp. v.
Olsen, 80 Cal. App. 3d 645, 651, 145 Cal. Rptr. 778, 781 (1978).

defendants liable for all of plaintiff's damages allocates damages
disproportionately to fault.8 1 This result has the concurrent effect
of encouraging bad faith claims. Fairness, as well as consistency,
dictates that the system allocate liability in proportion to fault to
all the parties without exception. However, to facilitate this objective, the policy of encouraging settlement must sometimes take
82
second priority.
Pure Liability in Proportionto Fault
As discussed above,8 3 when a joint tortfeasor settles for an
amount below his degree of fault as ultimately determined, the
nonsettling defendant will be held liable for damages greater than
his own degree of fault. Joint and several liability mandates that
the nonsettling defendant pay his unjust proportion of damages
regardless of whether the plaintiff is as much or more at fault for
his own injuries. Therefore, at the settlement stage of the litigation, the "slightly" negligent defendant is compelled to settle or
be faced with disproportionate liability.8 4 The contribution system of the Civil Procedure Code 85 also works to the disadvantage
of the "slightly" negligent defendant when he is faced with a pos8
sibly high pro-rata contribution. 6
Despite these apparent disadvantages, the California Supreme
Court in American Motorcycle chose to uphold the doctrine of
joint and several liability for three principal reasons. 87 First, the
court believed that in some instances the individual actions of
concurrent tortfeasors would be inseparable from the proximate
causation of plaintiff's injury or would be sufficient in and of
themselves to have caused the plaintiffs injuries. 8 8 Theoretically,
each defendant could be said to have severally caused the injury
and therefore should be held severally liable for redress. 89 How81. "Liability of concurrent tortfeasors in direct proportion to their relative degrees of fault is a highly desirable if not necessary element of any system of comparative negligence." American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. App.
3d 694, 697, 135 Cal. Rptr. 497, 503 (1977), rev'd, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 182 (1978). See also Fleming, The Supreme Court of California1974-75, Foreword ComparativeNegligence at Last-By JudicialChoice, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 239,

252-53 (1976).
82. See Comment, Comparative Negligence, Multiple Parties and Settlements,

65 CALn. L. REv. 1264, 1275-82 (1977).
83. See notes 11-24 and accompanying text supra.
84. See notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra.
85. See note 9 supra.
86. See note 7 supra.
87. 20 Cal. 3d at 588-89, 578 P.2d at 905-06, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89.
88. Id.
89. The rule adopted by the American Motorcycle majority seems logically applicable only to a relatively few cases. It is unlikely that many cases will arise in
which the defendants carry inadequate insurance coverage and the defendant's
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ever, the only time the plaintiff would not receive full compensation for his injuries under a system without joint and several
liability would be when one or more of the tortfeasors were
financially unable to satisfy their proportionate share of the damages. The majority of the court believed the defendant should pay
the balance of plaintiff's injuries in this instance merely because
of his status as a defendant.90
The majority of the court should not abandon the liability in
proportion to fault principle so eagerly.9 1 A solution would be to
give the jury a special instruction that if the facts indicate that
each defendant's actions alone would have been sufficient to
cause the plaintiffs injury, the jury must designate each defendant's proportion of fault at one hundred percent. The defendants
would then share the fault on a pro-rata basis unless one was
financially unable to do so. In this case, the other defendant(s)
would be required to pay the remainder because his fault would
dictate he pay it.
Second, the American Motorcycle majority insisted that "fairness" 92 dictates that joint and several liabilty be upheld to assist
a completely faultless plaintiff in receiving full redress from
"wrongdoing defendants"9 3 when any one of the tortfeasors is
financially unable to satisfy his proportionate liability. 94 Again,

however, the court's rationale was not based on any concept of
negligence law but rather the defendant assumed the burden
merely because he happened to be the defendant. Under present
actions are indivisible causes of, or sufficient causes to be responsible for, the
whole of plaintiff's injuries.

90.

In many instances a plaintiff will be completely free of all responsibility
for the accident, and yet, under the proposed abolition of joint and several
liability, such a completely faultless plaintiff, rather than a wrongdoing defendant, would be forced to bear a portion of the loss if any one of the concurrent tortfeasors should prove financially unable to satisfy his
proportioned share of the damages.
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 589, 578 P.2d at 905, 146
Cal. Rptr. at 188.
91. "[A] pure form of comparative negligence apportions liability in direct proportion to fault in all cases." Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 827, 532 P.2d 1226,
1242, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 874 (1975) (emphasis added). The court abandoned the liability in proportion to fault principle in an attempt to uphold the policy of encouraging settlement. See also Levine, Strict Products Liability and Comparative
Negligence: The Collision of Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 337 (1977).
92. 20 Cal. 3d at 590, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
93. Id. at 589, 578 P.2d at 905, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
94. Id.

law, the court not only asks defendants to take plaintiffs as they
find them95 but also to take codefendants as they find them. This
situation is inequitable. 96
Finally, in pushing the disparity to its furthest extreme, the
court suggested that even when the plaintiff is at fault for his own
injuries, the defendants must pay for what they did not cause.
The plaintiff is not held responsible because his wrong is not tortious in character.9 7 True as this may be, the fact remains that
both faults were proximate causes of the plaintiff's injuries.98
Thus, the plaintiff should be responsible in like manner for the injuries the law seeks to redress. 99
Liability in proportion to fault demands that when the plaintiff
has settled with one or more joint tortfeasors, a subsequent judgment against co-tortfeasors should be reduced by the proportion
of the plaintiff's damages attributable to the fault of the settled
tortfeasor.OO When one of the joint tortfeasors is financially unable to assume his proportionate share of the damages, the other
joint tortfeasors must pay the unsatisfied share only when their
fault dictates that they should01 regardless of whether the plain95. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5, at 260 (4th ed. 1971).
96. The legislature has stated explicitly that contribution law is to be administered in accordance with the principles of equity. CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 875(b)
(West Supp. 1978). See also note 101 infra.
97.
Although we recognized in Li that a plaintiff's self-directed negligence
would justify reducing his recovery in proportion to his degree of fault for
the accident, the fact remains that insofar as the plaintiffs conduct creates
only a risk of self-injury, such conduct, unlike that of a negligent defendant, is not tortious.
American Motorycycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 589-90, 578 P.2d at 906,
146 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
98. The plaintiff and the defendant are held to the same standard of care in
determining relative fault. W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 65, at 419 (4th ed.
1971). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 463, 465 (1965).
99. "But if the plaintiff is himself at fault, his 'equity' is no greater than that of
the co-defendants, and it would be a perfectly defensible solution to make him
share that risk." Fleming, The Supreme Court of California 1974-1975, Foreword:
Comparative Negligence at Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 CAUIF. L REV. 239, 251
(1976). See also Goldenberg & Nicholas, Comparative Liability Among Joint
Tortfeasors: The Aftermath of IA v. Yellow Cab Co., 8 U. WEST. LA.L. REV. 23, 46
(1976).
100. The legislature considered making this change by a bill introduced on
March 28, 1978, as S.B. 1959. This bill would have placed the burden of an inequitably low settlement on the plaintiff by providing that a plaintiff's claim is discharged as against the other nonsettling defendants by the greatest of the amount
stipulated in the release, the amount paid for it, or the amount of the released
tortfeasor's equitable share based on his fault. This bill died in committee on Nov.
30, 1978. See also American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 615,
578 P.2d at 923, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 206 (Clark, J., dissenting).
101. An alternative solution advocated by some commentators would apportion
the burden of an insolvent defendant among all parties, including plaintiffs, in pro-
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tiff contributed to his own injury.

Eliminationof Bad Faith Claims
Bad faith claims typically arise in joint tortfeasor cases for one
principal reason-the nonsettling defendant has been compelled
to pay more damages than his degree of fault suggests he
should.03 Adherence to the suggested rules would eliminate bad
faith claims because a joint tortfeasor would never be liable for
more than his proportionate share of the damages regardless of
the settlement. Also, eliminating bad faith claims conveniently
solves the malicious prosecution counterclaim problem.
The abolition of joint and several liabilty and the adoption of a
pure liability in proportion to fault system would also eliminate
the dilemma of defense counsel for insurance carriers. 04 When
the primary insurance carrier is offered settlement at or within
policy limits, he can accept the offer without exposing himself to a
bad faith claim because the nonsettling defendant will pay the
plaintiff only in accordance with his degree of fault. Hence, the
degree of fault for which the settling defendant is ultimately
found responsible is immaterial. The primary insurance carrier's
acceptance of the offer also prevents the excess carrier's bad faith

claim.105
The only question remaining is the extent to which a plaintiff
will be discouraged from settlement when he knows that a settleportion to their fault in causing the plaintiff's injuries. See, e.g., Fleming, The
Supreme Court of California 1974-1975, Foreword: Comparative Negligence at
Last-By Judicial Choice, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 239, 257-58 (1976). See also American
Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 614, 578 P.2d at 922, 146 Cal. Rptr.
at 205 (Clark, J., dissenting). This "solution" is unsatisfactory because it merely
compounds the inequities in the present system by compelling another person to
pay disproportionately to his fault. Because a jury's determination as to the
amount of plaintiff's damages is given a strong presumption of validity, Bertero v.
National Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 64, 529 P.2d 608, 623, 118 Cal. Rptr. 184, 199 (1974),
so should its determinations of fault. Hyatt v. Sierra Boat Co., 79 Cal. App. 3d 325,
346, 145 Cal. Rptr. 47, 59 (1978); CAT- Crw. PRoc. CODE § 657 (West 1976). No mere
circumstance, such as the ability of a given defendant to pay, should upset fault
allocations. In other words, if plaintiffs are allowed to enjoy the good fortune of a
high judgment award, defendants should be allowed to enjoy the good fortune of
low fault allocations.
102. See Comment, Comparative Negligence, Multiple Parties and Settlements,
65 CALIF. L. REV. 1264, 1274 (1977). See also note 101 supra.
103. See notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
104. See notes 58-61 and accompanying text supra.
105. Id.

ment below the settling defendant's degree of fault will preclude
the plaintiff from a "full recovery." This concern should not be
significant because equity in comparative negligence mandates
the subordination of the policy of encouraging settlement to the
principle of liabilty in proportion to fault. In this instance the
plaintiff may be discouraged from settlement. 10 However, some
commentators contend that this may be an infrequent occur7
rence. 0
CONCLUSION

The present system of comparative negligence and contribution
in California is anything but "pure." In many cases, damages are
allocated disproportionately to fault, thereby encouraging bad
faith claims and discouraging settlement. Both statutory and case
law contribution systems tend to extort the "slightly" negligent,
nonsettling defendant by compelling him to settle or be faced
with liability heavily in excess of his degree of fault. Equity, consistency, and logic require the adoption of a system of pure liability in proportion to fault. The doctrine of joint and several
liability should be abolished.
When necessary, the principle of liability in proportion to fault
should control over the policy of encouraging settlement. However, settlement should continue to be promoted whenever possible. Settling defendants should remain immune from claims of
contribution 08 and should be allowed to recover any amount paid
in settlement in excess of their proportionate share of fault. Prior
to legislative implementation of a system of pure liability in proportion to fault, settling defendants should be allowed to file malicious prosecution counterclaims when faced with a claim of bad
faith in the original suit. No significant complexity would be added to the cases because the same evidence is relevant to both
claims. The interests of judicial efficiency and economy might
also be promoted.
Comparative negligence is currently so confusing that one California Supreme Court justice has found cause to exclaim: "Because the majority of this court continue compounding the
incomprehensible, we can only hope that the legislature will reclaim its rightful role in determining basic issues of social pol106. See notes 42-46 and accompanying text supra.
107. See Comment, ComparativeNegligence, Multiple Partiesand Settlements,
65 CALIF. L. Rnv. 1264, 1275-82 (1977).
108. See note 9 supra.
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icy."109 The legislative changes necessary in the areas of
contribution and joinder could be accomplished without difficultylO and could accompany the implementation of a pure liability in proportion to fault system. Hence, the time is ripe for the
legislature to act.

J. ADAM SARANCIK

109. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 332, 335, 579 P.2d 441, 448, 146
Cal. Rptr. 550, 557 (1978) (Clark, J., concurring).
110.
Several liability is simple in application in the Li setting ....
The substantive rules which we have here articulated require procedural companions. Once the principle of allocation of liability among defendants based upon their respective degrees of negligence is accepted, there
is a patent interest in having all persons whose fault contributed to the
injury before the court in one action. One set of findings of fact or one set
of special jury verdicts can then determine the entire matter as to all who
are involved. Multiple litigation can be avoided.
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. App. 3d 694, 706, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 497, 504 (1977), rev'd, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).

